A Historical Outlook on the Financial Sector and the Perspective on Achievable Progress of Ukraine by Mytsenko, V. I.
УДК 336.13.051
V.I. Mytsenko, candidate of pedagogical sciences
Kirovohrad National Technical University
A Historical Outlook on the Financial Sector and the 
Perspective on Achievable Progress of Ukraine
The assessment of the financial sector of Ukraine at the beginning of the reformation period and the 
prospects for the future development has been disclosed. A comparative characteristic and the methodology for 
general actions and main issues of the development have been analysed.
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The article provides an assessment of the situation in Ukraine’s financial sector for the 
last 10 years and defines a policy agenda for the next stages of reform.
The perspective of reforms which this article presents is of most importance for further 
development of the financial sector of Ukraine. The successful implementation the reforms 
will face a variety of political questioning and opposition. So it is important to define some 
progress markers to provide a starting point of the advantages and disadvantages. It provides a 
forward looking perspective of what might realistically be expected by way of new financing 
for the economy through the period to the end of 2006 in the event that a sustained reform 
effort is now adopted. It does this by comparing Ukraine’s performance so far with that of 
other transition economies in the Former Soviet Union and Central Europe where financial 
sector performance has so far been more impressive.
The analysis of the volumes of new finance for the productive sectors of the economy 
that could be realised in case of successful completion of the reform for the sector. The target 
year of 2006. The methodology used is a careful examination of what has been achieved in 
countries with transition economies which have achieved greater progress in financial sector 
development. Most other Former Soviet Union (FSU) countries and a few Eastern European 
countries faced the post-Soviet period with apparently similar problems to Ukraine. Several 
have dealt with these with greater success as far as financial sector development is concerned. 
This is true of all three Baltic states, to a lesser extent of Russia and to some degree of Poland. 
So these are among the comparators that can be used for our analysis.
It is important to analyse Ukraine in the wider context of banking transition. There is 
growing evidence that the transition from a socialist banking system to a market-oriented one 
comes in three major phases:
- catastrophic dislocation from hyperinflation. In this phase, there is no confidence 
in any form of money -  cash or deposit based. This phase for Ukraine was prolonged until 
end-1966 with the delayed introduction of the Hryvna (UAHr);
- sound cash money is established. This usually occurs through currency reform. 
However, in this phase, the population is not yet confident enough of banks to use deposits. 
This means the banking system remains suppressed below its natural level relative to GDP 
and the ratio of cash in circulation remains high. It is the end of this phase that Ukraine now 
appears to have reached -  it is the last European transition economy to do so;
- the third phase is when the rebuilding of the banking sector can really begin as an 
integral part of the new market economy. This happens principally by reducing relative 
reliance on cash and by increasing deposits as both the platform for economic transactions 
and as one of the prime savings instruments. It is this phase that Ukraine seems about to enter 
provided that the improvements of the past year are sustained.
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- Since the third phase is the most immediately relevant to Ukraine, it can be 
sectioned out into three distinct sub-stages as follows:
- the first sub-stage is to bring down the very high cash to deposit ratio typical of 
the end of phase-2, so that non-cash transfers via banks start to take over from cash 
transactions and other alternatives to banking such as barter. It has the merit of being 
sufficiently far in the future to allow complex reforms to realise their beneficial results in full. 
It is also sufficiently close as to remain relevant to the political and election calendar.
Other transition countries at this stage are some Central Asian and all three trans­
Caucasian States (Armenia has already virtually completed it);
• the second sub-stage involves a mix of a further reduction of the cash to deposit ratio 
but more important is the beginnings of a genuine mobilisation of new savings into banks. 
This is the stage that the three Baltic States, Russia and the two largest South-European 
transition economies (Bulgaria and Romania) currently occupy;
• the third sub-stage involves deposit growth in banks predominantly via new savings 
mobilisation. At this stage too the cash:deposit ratio achieves near the EU levels. Countries in 
this phase include almost all the first wave of Central European candidates for accession to 
the EU.
From 1989 to 2000 Ukraine had extraordinarily weak progress through 1998 and the 
beginnings of significantly more positive movements in 1999 and 2000. More specifically, in 
1999 there were first registered falls in the cash to deposit ratio since transition began. This in 
turn contributed to a 2.5 percentage points rise in the ratio of deposits to GDP. This was five 
times the net change achieved in the previous four years and was sufficient to allow the 
banking system to grow at a compound 20 percentage points faster than nominal GDP. This 
represents a widening of the differential growth rate from the previous two years even though 
the 1999/2000 period actually includes the impact of the 1998 Russian crisis [1].
In spite of this the propositions advanced in the previous two sections -  for the 
moment Ukraine still does not have a banking sector of any real significance to the economy 
and it still lags most other FSU and Central European economies. Looking into the future, it is 
extremely unlikely that Ukraine can return to the level of monetisation seen towards the end 
of the Soviet era. The highest ratio of deposits to GDP Ukraine might achieve is unlikely to 
exceed 45~50% -  5 times the present level. According to the forecast of “Ukraine: the 
financial sector and the economy” even this could take a decade or more to attain. The 
practical question is what is realistically possible by 2006? Experience from other FSU 
countries shows that the first stage of recovery as defined above need not take more than three 
to four years to complete. This alone would be enough to put Ukraine in 2007 where 
Lithuania is now.
This simple comparison can be improved by looking at what the progression from the 
1989 starting point has meant for financial savings across a larger number of transition 
economies. The peer-group taken for this purpose is a selection of the European former Soviet 
States for which comparable data are available. Table 3 below compares current and pre­
reform levels of PPP-adjusted per capita GDP, broad money and deposits measured in US 
dollars.
Table 1 shows that all countries have experienced larger declines in their financial 
sectors than in their levels of GDP. Ukraine has suffered a similar decline in financial savings 
(broad money or deposits) to Russia and Armenia, even though its per capita GDP has fallen 
by less than in those two countries. This evidence suggests that today’s limited depth of the 
Ukrainian banking system cannot be explained by its sustained economic recession alone. 
There are other forces at work.
Additional explanations are suggested by the Baltic States, which suffered similar 
peak-to-trough declines in per-capita GDP to Ukraine but have progressed far better in 
recovering lost per capita income and financial savings (Table 1). Closer study has shown that 
recovery in those cases bears a direct relation with the degree of banking system
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consolidation that has been achieved in the past five years [2]. The clearest example of this is 
Estonia, where GDP per capita is now 50% above the pre-reform levels and where all of the 
1989 level of broad money per capita has been recovered (compared to only 18% in the case 
of Ukraine), but this time on a voluntary basis.
Table 1. Impact to Date of Transition on Incomes and Financial Savings
All figures PPP-adjusted US$ 
Pre-reform levels (1989):
Ukraine Russia Armenia Estonia Latvia Lithua
nia
- GDP per capita 3314 5871 5058 4914 5094 5505
- Deposits per capita 2114 4042 2112 2227 2210 3620
- Broad money per capita 
Most recent levels (2000):
2484 4750 2746 2800 2950 4306
- GDP per capita 2875 4400 2525 7425 6850 6900
- Deposits per capita 250 650 200 2250 1300 1075
- Broad money per capita 
Percent change (1989~2000):
450 850 300 2800 1975 1500
- GDP per capita -13% -25% -50% +51% +34% +25%
- Deposits per capita -88% -84% -91% +1% -41% -70%
- Broad money per capita -82% -83% -89% 0% -33% -65%
Trough year(s) / peak declines 1996 1999 93-96 1993 92/93 93/94
- GDP per capita -36% -44% -63% -23% -40% -38%
- Deposits per capita -94% -87% -97% -81% -81% -89%
- Broad money per capita -92% -86% -95% -74% -82% -89%
To our mind there are two possible paths for Ukraine to take. The comparison of how 
different countries have progressed through the transition process described above offers 
some interesting insights about how much progress Ukraine can aspire to by the end of 2006. 
There seem to be clear, good and bad paths. We can illustrate these by comparing banking 
transition for Estonia (a strong performer) and Russia (a weak performer). Estonia has 
followed an aggressive reform path, with no protection for weak banks from failure. In the 
early 1990s, banks accounting for around 40% of total banking system assets failed with no 
compensation for depositors. This cost the economy the equivalent of 11% of GDP in lost real 
savings, but within five years this had all been recovered. Estonia now boasts two of the three 
largest banks in the Baltic States (despite being the smallest of the three economies). Both of 
these now have strong strategic investors and are expanding abroad. Recovery of the banking 
sector survived the twin shocks of the Asian and Russian crises and now appears to be 
accelerating again. This is despite further bank failures in 1998 and 1999.
Cumulatively the banking system has grown substantially in terms of deposits but has 
shrunk in terms of numbers of banks from around fifty banks in 1993 to just five now. Overall 
domestic deposits stand now at 30% of GDP and over the last five years (1996~2000 
inclusive) the equivalent of 10% of GDP annually has been injected into the economy by way 
of new credit, more than half of which has been domestically funded. In contrast Russian 
reform has been at best sporadic, with a large degree of politicisation of the banking system 
and both overt favouring of selected banks as well as protection for both depositors and 
shareholders from the consequences of failure. Even the Bank Rehabilitation Agency 
established in the wake of the 1998 crisis has been blocked by political pressures (particularly 
at regional level) from closing banks that have been weakened to a point where a return to 
solvency and viability is impossible. In short the Russian banking system has been treated in a 
similar way to the Ukrainian banking sector.
Russia has never suffered a single banking crisis of the same magnitude as the 
Estonian one in 1993, but equally it has not witnessed such a strong and sustained recovery.
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Moreover every few years, what progress there had been was reversed. Over the last five 
years its banking system has injected less than 4% of GDP on average annually by way of 
new domestic finance and less than half of this has gone to the non-bank non-government 
sector (NBNGS) to fund potentially growth-supporting investment. Russia has done 
marginally better than Ukraine but suffers from most of the same structural problems -  its 
record on banking development is clearly not one for Ukraine to seek to emulate.
Lithuania is an interesting example of a country that appears to have switched modes. 
Up until 1997, the authorities there took various steps to avoid the consequences of large bank 
failures. In some cases this involved depositing public funds with banks approaching crisis 
and after the inevitable failures attempting to mitigate the consequences of failure with 
transfers of deposits to the state savings bank. The identifiable costs of these unstructured 
efforts were equivalent to several percentage points of GDP (at a time when total deposits in 
the banking system only amounted to 14% of GDP). Then in 1997 a properly constituted 
deposit insurance fund was established with publicly subscribed capital of barely 0.1% of 
GDP. This fund has since had to pay out on two further bank failures but without any 
interruption to the remonetization process.
Within two years of establishing the fund, total deposits recovered all the ground lost 
relative to GDP during the crisis and household deposits relative to GDP surpassed pre-crisis 
levels. The establishment of a strong, well-funded deposit insurance system was accompanied 
by concerted moves to restructure, properly privatise and seek significant foreign strategic 
investors for the two remaining large state banks -  agricultural and savings -  as well as the 
merger of the two largest private banks. In part the switch of emphasis in Lithuania was part a 
stark choice between muddling on as before, or having any realistic chance of joining the EU 
alongside other Central European States.
There are clear parallels here with the choice facing Ukraine -  to embrace 
consolidation and maintain the impressive remonetization dynamic established over the last 
two years, or try to avoid it, lose growth momentum in the banking system and ultimately 
increase the cost of bank failure to the public purse. Obviously the recommendation of this 
review is to follow the Estonian/Lithuanian model rather than the Russian one.
In the year 2000, the greater public confidence in the government and the achievement 
of positive growth stimulated a significant rise in deposits in the banks on the part of both 
enterprises and households. We can surmise that this rise may also have been helped by 
factors such as the governments far more disciplined attitude to non-payment (especially in 
the energy sector); improved NBU supervisory performance that resulted in better 
information about and differentiation between good and bad banks and the first pay-outs 
under the deposit insurance scheme. But a competing hypothesis is that the surge in deposits 
is the passive consequence of higher payments balances associated with the impressive GDP 
growth -  itself a consequence of the temporary oil-driven gains in Russia. Either way it is too 
early to say whether 2000 marks the start of a promising new trend or merely a one off blip 
around the old and disappointing trend.
The conclusion we draw is that the Ukrainian authorities should use all their efforts to 
sustain the good performance of 2000. In particular, the improved supervisory capacity should 
be used to accelerate the delayed consolidation of the banking sector thereby enabling a 
pattern of future development closer to that of Estonia and other Baltic states. This has the 
prospect of directly and quickly improving the average costs in Ukrainian banking. It is an 
approach that must allow the failure of those banks that can no longer operate at reasonable 
margins. If the authorities reject this possibility and instead persist with a more protectionist 
approach, the 2000 performance will likely be shown to have been one blip around the old 
trend and the sector will likely face a pattern of future development closer to that of Russia. In 
this case, the medium term future to 2006 will see a moribund banking system that is failing 
(as until very recently) both to mobilise domestic savings and to provide new credit to the 
domestic economy in significant volumes. Obviously the bolder of these two alternatives may
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itself seem very risky but the lessons from other transition economies are definitely 
encouraging.
The analysis presented here suggests that this turn-around cannot happen unless 
Ukraine adopts the structural reforms of the more successful of the FSU reforming countries. 
The crucial ones -  consistent with the framework proposed below are:
- measures to encourage the strengthening and accelerated restructuring of the 
banking sector;
- further actions to improve bank regulation and supervision and especially 
enforcement;
- a systematic campaign to reduce the costs on banks that are caused directly by 
government policies;
- general actions including de-regulation to encourage a far more favourable 
environment for bank clients and especially small and medium enterprises.
- measures to lay better foundations for the gradual emergence and growth of a more 
significant non-bank financial institutions sub-sector.
- allow a significant number of today’s higher-cost bank to disappear -  including 
some of the top-7 currently subject to rehabilitation -  and allow banking activities to 
concentrate around the lower cost base of the remaining banks;
- for the larger and politically sensitive banks, the focus should be on more directly
- distinguishing the potentially efficient from the clearly defunct. This should then 
be allowed to form the basis for a managed consolidation of the larger banks;
- for most banks the NBU needs to be more consistent in the application of its 
policies as well as transparent and expeditious in enforcing liquidations (including mergers) 
on banks which are indisputably unable to meet its own capital and other prudential 
requirements.
The new agenda may also need to include selective and limited actions to create new 
financial institutions -  the pronouncements of the authorities frequently refer to the need for 
this. But past experience in Ukraine readily confirms that this approach is not a priority. It 
must be subordinated to the more fundamental reforms listed in the six bullet points above. In 
the current environment it is extraordinarily difficult to create successful and self-sustaining 
new institutions. In the absence of basic reforms, new financial institutions -  especially those 
owned and controlled by the state -  will be irrelevant to Ukraine’s problems.
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В статті розкриваються деякі аспекти оцінки фінансового сектору України на початку періоду 
реформування та перспективи подальшого розвитку. Проаналізована порівняльна характеристика та 
методологія загальних дій та основних питань розвитку фінансового сектору України.
В статье раскрываются некоторые аспекты оценки финансового сектора Украины в начале 
периода реформирования и перспективы последующего развития. Проанализирована сравнительная 
характеристика и методология общих действий и основных вопросов развития финансового сектора 
Украины.
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